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I want to start by posing some questions about the concept of ideology 
as such, in order, then, to try to get a clearer sense, and perhaps 
connon agreement, on what I understand by the ideological instance of the 
message. On the other hand, I have neither the intension nor pretension 
to solve any of the substantive problems of this delicate field of 
sociology, and I certainly cannot offer a theory of ideology. I’ll pick 
up here and there the bits and pieces which I have found useful when 
dealing with ideological content of the media. I’m sure that, even in 
such a modest undertaking, we will find points of disagreement, which 
can be taken up in discussion.
To try and link the phenomena of mass communication with the soiiological 
problematic of ideologies is a very delicate and difficult enterprise. 
However I am convinced that, when we establish the relation between both 
fields and clear up some of the problems implicit in trying to establish 
this relation, we will have achieved a very positive step towards a 
reconccptualisation of the sociology of communication. The introduction 
of a relatively complex model of ideology will give firmer theoretical 
basis to the investigations on mass communication. On the other hand, 
the profound technological transformations of the struct»ires of 
communication in urban-industrial societies seem to require a revision 
cf the classical sociological methodology for the study of ideological 
processes. As usual in these cases, the difficulties begin when we 
have to decide what exactly we understand by 'ideology' and 'ideological'.
What the classical sociology of knowledge called 'ideology' is not the 
same thing which this term denotes in more recent work in, say, the 
sociology of 'piblic opinion' or political science. A change has 
occurred in the problematic, so that the definition of the concepts 
which determine the two fields are not the aazne. For cr the
attempt to identify the concept if 'ideology' with that of 'opinion' 
dilutes the notion of dominance whicn was always there in the more class­
ical approach* In currant political science, the sociologist who 
examines ideological material works with opinions, usually those given 
in interview, which are responses to very precise questions, such as: 
what party do you vote for? why? etc- These opinion researchers have 
moved from the comprehensive concept of ideology to a far more limited 
concept of 'opinion'- i.e. from the study of the philosophy of ideas and 
culture to the opinions of the man in the street. This appears as more 
'operational', and it can certainly be more easily quantified: but it 
tends to cake the whole framework of ideas within which individuals 
express 'opinions' as given, and neucral, and therefore unproblematic: 
all that requres pin-pointing is where individuals position themselves 
inside this framework, or how their position has changed as a result of 
exposure to certain 'stimuli'. Thus, the shift in the theoretical 
perspective has also been followed by a methodological change, leading 
to the introduction of now techniques of research and modem ways of 
measuring effects find attitudes. In a way, these new techniques support 
a completely row perspective in the analysis of cultural phenomena from 
that indicated by the concept, 'ideology'. This change can itself be 
seen as 'ideological', since, by taking the ideological framework in 
v-ich opinions ore ranked as 'neutral', it proceeded to analyse the 
field as if ' ideological a>mmur>i cat ion' in the more classical sense could 
not exist at all. That is - it produced, as its result, a new state 
of things, already operating inside its problematic: the 'ideology of the 
'end -of-idcoiogies'.
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This process could lead us to discuss the related sociological mythology 
of 'mass society', this pecular social system where ideologies seem to 
have become invisible, but where, in fact, far from having disappeared, 
ideologies now impregnate all the fields of social communication, and 
its self-reflection in communication research.
In marxist analysis and in other recent developments in the sociology 
of knowledge, '.hat is called the 'ideological forms' covers a very 
extensive area; in works of the young Mar:c, it tends practically to 
coincide with the concept of superstructure as such, i.e. it comprehends 
the basic aspects which usually classify the cultural contents of a society 
or social formation. This idea no doubt brings many problems with it: 
but what wc mean here is that, according to Marx, the theory of ideology 
(which he unfortunately never finished) should include all of what we would 
call today the 'sociology of culture'. This comprehensive intention has 
been very much reduced in later developments in positivistic sociology, 
and the area has split into various specialized disciplines, such as the 
sociology of art, the sociology of literature, of religion, etc. where the 
notion of ideology, linked to a global model of culture and the productive 
system is no longer in evidence. Nowadays, the concept of 'ideology' is 
limited to the field of political science, though the marxist model didn't 
imply that the notion of ideology was more significant in the area of 
political ideas than in other areas of culture.
The important point is that, in marxist analysis, though the account of 
the system of dominant ideas, as developed say in the German Ideology 
is highly abstract, it is also very far reaching and comprehends the 
whole general interpretation of social reality and aspects of culture 
in history available in a particular society. CurreiHy, the contents 
which seem to interest the sociologist are much reduced: they no longer 
form an inclusive totality or 'mental horizon'. They are limited to very 
specific ar.d limited aspects of social reality. The great bulk of current 
research in, for example, political sociology and opinion formation, 
measures ce~*ely the degree of acceptance or refusal of the ideological 
content of particular messages, with respect to quite specific beliefs or 
issues. In short, the link between 'ideology' and 'communication' has 
already beer, made in current mainstream positivistic research, but it has 
been incorrectly formulated - formulated in such a way as to disguise 
the problem or conceal its real dimensions. The fundamental difference 
between this kind of research and a marxist analysis is that the latter, 
when studying ideological systems, sets out to uncover the conditions 
and rules of organization of the 'representations' of individuals. Two 
things are involved here: (l) the idea that social processes, conflicts, 
the social relations of production etc. are only appropriated by social 
individuals via the forms in which they are 'represented ' (2) The fact 
that, though these 'representations' freely and openly circulate, the 
'conditions and rules' which allow them to be generated never appear 
on the level of consciousness. These representations are produced 
by social processes. We can say that they are the 'manifest forms' 
of these processes. These 'manifest forms' - what Marx called the 
"phenomenal forms of the appearance" of social processes - determine 
the "spontaneous perceptions" which Individuals have of these processes. 
These perceptions are 'spontaneous' in the sense that they seem to be 
the 'natural' ways in which processes are to be understood. They 
constitute our*common sense awareness* or 'consciousness' of social 
processes. However, s?nce some part of the content of these processes 
are, at the same time, hidden or concealed in our spontaneous perceptions 
of them, they serve both to shew, and to obscure what is going on, and our 
relation to it. Spontaneous perceptions constitute our everyday 
consciousness of social processes. When these spontaneous perceptions
3are socially objectivated, and extended into the form of a discourse, 
then we may say that we have arrived at the 'ideological instance'.
Althusser defines ideology as "a 'representation' of the imaginary 
relationships of individuals to their real conditions of existence." 
(Ideology and the State, p.153? NL3) Of course, the imaginary character of 
this relation determines and explains the distorting character of ideology. 
According to Poulantzas (Political Pover and Social Classes),p. 207:
"This social-imaginary relation, which performs a real practical- 
social function, cannot be reduced to the problematic of alienation 
and false consciousness=
It follows that through its constitution ideology is involved 
in the functioning of this social-imaginary relation, and is therefore 
necessarily false; its social function is not to give agents a true 
knowledge of the social structure but simply to insert them as it 
were into their practical activities supporting this structure. 
Precisely because it is determined by its structure, at the level 
of exper ionce the social whole renains opaque to the agents."
Marx shows that the fundamental basis of the capitalist economic 
structure (i.e. surplus value) 'hides itself completely from the 
consciousness of the agents of production (i.e. capitalists and workers). 
From this it is assumed that tho agents of production necessarily have 
a false and distorted perception of the economic process. We must insist 
that this distortion (ideological) cannot be explained by way of a type 
of 'bad conscience' or 'wish to cheat1 of tho dominant classes, but is due 
to the necessary obscuring of the social realities. In short, our 
'spontaneous perceptions', which take off from the distorted level (where 
'surplus value' is hidden, must, themselves ho distorted- There is, 
therefore, a level of 'deep structure', which is 'invisible' and 
'unconscious', which continually structured our immediate conscious 
perceptions in this distorted way. This is why, in ideological analysis, 
we must go to the structuring level of messages, not just to their surface 
forms - that is, to the level where the distortions are coded. It is also 
why we need a scientific analysis - which Marx said must penetrate from the 
'phenomenal forms' to the 'real relations' below, in order to disclose 
what has been 'hidden', or expressed only in a distorted form.
In For Marx, Althusser agrees:
"It is customary to suggest that ideology belongs to the region 
of 'consciousness'. We must not be misled by this appellation 
which is still contaminated by the idealist problematic that preceded 
Marx. In truth, ideology has very little to do with 'consciousness', 
even supposing this term to have an unambiguous meaning. It is 
profoundly unconscious, even when it presents itslef in a reflected 
form (as in pre-Marxist 'philosophy'). Ideology is indeed a system 
of representations, but in the majority of cases these representations 
have nothing to do with 'consciousness': they are usually images and 
occasionally concepts, but it is above all as structures that they 
impose on the vast majority of men, not via their 'consciousness'."
"So ideology is a matter of the 1 ivc-d relation between men and 
their world. This relation, that only appears as 'conscious' on 
condition that it is unconscious, in the same way only seems to be 
simple on condition that it is complex, that it is not a simple 
relation but a relation between relations, a second degree r lation.
In ideology men do indeed express, not the relation between 
them and their conditions of existence, but the way they live 
therd^tions between their, and their conditions of existence: this 
presupposes both a real relation and an 1 imaginary*,'lived* relation. 
Ideology, then, is the expression of the relation between men and 
their ’world', that is the (overdeterminad) unity of the real 
relation and the imaginary relation between them and their real 
conditions of existence."
We will take up this question of the ’unconscious' level of ideology and 
its relation to 'code' and 'structure' in a moment. But first there is 
another aspect of the Marxist notion of ideology which needs further clarif­
ication. This is the question of ideology as 'dominant' - and of the role 
of ideology in maintaining the dominance cr hegemony of particular social 
classes.
In some recent marxist analysis we find that the role of integrating and 
unifying, the function of the cohesion of social forms, is precisely 
attributed to the ideological instance. In such cases, ideology is the level 
which has the function of pr serving the uaity of the whole social system 
(i.e. the status quo). This position sees the ideological level as the over­
determining instance in the process of social formations. In this case, 
ideology is, by definition, 'dominant' - a distortion: hence the important 
distinction is not between dominant and dominated ideologies, but between 
ideology, as such and theory, or science. Much of Althusser's references 
to ideology in For Marx make use of this ideology/science distinction.
In other places, and especially in later formulations, Althusser seems 
to have reformulated his position. There can be a theory of ideology 
'in general', which tells us about the "mechanism" of ideology, and which is 
thus "abstract with respect to every real ideological formation". In this 
sense, ideology is, like Freud's unconscious, "eternal" and "without a history", 
since its structure and function is similar whenever and wherever it appears. 
This usage is not very clear, and Althusser himself is tertative about it 
(pl52): in so far as we understand it, it refers to the functions which 
ideology (singular) always serves, whatever its historical location.
There can be, second, a theory of particular ideologies (plural). These 
are always specific, always "express class positions" (pl52), always 
"ftpend in the last resort on the history of social formations, and thus of 
the modes of production combined in the social formations and of the dass 
struggle which develop in them," What there cannot be is a theory of 
ideologies (plural) in general. For this would be to assume that there was 
a common content, or common characteristics to the different, historically- 
determined ideologies: and this would be to falsely abstract some 'universal 
core' to all ideologies, and rob them of their historicity. It is clear, 
especially from the PS to Ideology and The State, which he added to clarify 
matters after Poulantzas's criticism, that Althusser does not conceive of 
a dominant ideology ruling throughout without contradiction. On the 
contrary, he insists: (see quote ppl71-2 NLBi.?')
5Barthes, in his last book Le Plaisir IXi Textc, says (my translation):
"It is said currently: 'dominant ideology'. This expression is 
incongruous. Because after all, what is ideology? It is precisely the 
idea as long as it dominates: ideology cannot be anything else but dominant.
As much as it is justifiable to speak of ideology of dominant class because 
there actually exists a dominated class, it is inconsequent to speak of 
'dominant ideology' because there is no dominated ideology: on the side of 
the 'dominated' there is nothing, no ideology - and it is the last degree 
of alienation - the ideology which they are obliged (to symbolise, therefore 
to live) to borrow from the class which dominates. The social struggle 
cannot be reduced to the struggle of two rival ideologies: it is the 
subversion of all ideologies which is in cause."
But in the same passage, Barthes himself is quite ambiguous about the 
non-existence of other ideological significations apart from those emitted 
by the 'dominant ideology'.
"Some people want a text (art, a painting) without any shadow, cut 
out from the 'dominant ideology'; but that is to want a text 
without fertility, unproductive, a sterile text (...) The text 
needs its own shadow: that shadow is a bit of ideology (...) 
subversion must produce its own clear-obscure."
Well, I would ask, doesn't this clair-obscure in fact point to some sort 
of oppositional ideology? Veron, commenting on the above quotation of 
Althusser's ("Ideology is indeed a system of representations ..... they 
are usually images and occasionally concepts but it is above all as 
structures that they impose on the vast majority of men,") says: ....
"....if ideologies are structures in the sense structuralism uses 
this expression then, they are not 'images' nor 'concepts' (we can 
say, they are not contents) but are sets of rules which determine an 
organization and the functioning of images and concepts,"
Wo can here already see the first foundations for the introduction of the 
notion of code.
"Ideology is a system of coding reality and not a determined set 
of coded messages with this system (...) This way ideology becomes 
autonomous in relation to the consciousness or intention of its agents: 
these nay be conscious of their points of view about social forms, 
but not of the semantic conditions (rules and categories of 
codification) which make possible those points of view." (my translation)
("Semanticization of Violence")
In another text Veron illustrates his point with an analogy: he imagines that 
there was a computer prepared tc receive as input a certain type of message 
and to emit as output a classification of each message as consistent or not 
with a certain ideology. He concludes: " ... we shall call the ideological 
system, not the input or the output of the machine, but the programme according 
to which the computer emits and/or recognizes ideological systems. From 
this point of view, then, and at this level of analysis an 'ideology' may be 
defined as a system of semantic rules to generate messages." (Ideologia y 
C-mnunicacion De Masas - my translation.) In many ways this perspective 
coincides with Eco's, when he writes about ideological meanings. Eco 
understands ideology to be the 'universe of knowledge of the receiver and cf 
the group to which he belongs'. He thus makes ideology more or less 
coterminous with his 'culture in the anthropological sense'. Before this
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universe of knowledge is communicated, semiclogical analysis will not be 
able to detect it; it will therefore be necessary for it first to be 
"reduced to a system of communicative conventions." "However, to achieve 
this, it is necessary that the system of knowledge becomes a system of 
£igns: the ideology is recognisable when, once socialized, it becomes a code." 
(La Struttura Asscnte - my transi.)
From this observation Veron develops his argument: "Ideology is not a 
particular type of message, or a class of social discourses, but it is 
one of the many levels of organization of the messages, from the point of 
view of its semantic properties. Ideology is therefore a level of significa­
tion which can be present in any type of message, even in the scientific 
discourse. Any material of social conmunication is susceptible to an 
ideological reading." For Veron, this ideological reading "consists in 
the discovery of the implicit or non-nanifest organization of the message."
For the analysis of this latent organization it would be necessary to 
study the mechanisms of that organization - that is, of selection and 
combination. "From this perspective we can si define ideology (...) as a 
system of semantic rules which express a certain level of organization of 
messages." It would be only through the disentangling of these semantic rules 
that we can get to the core of a message. However, in the analysis of the 
ideological meanings, the 'core' does not refer only to the content of the 
message or its 'non-manifest organization’. When a message is omitted, it 
isn't only what is said that has a signification but also the way it is 
said, and what is not said and could be said. The significations in a message 
arc established by means of a code and it is this code which permits the 
message to be organized, i.e. permits the selections and combination of the 
signs which actually constitute the message. Ihe coding and decoding of 
a message implies the usage of the sane code; that is, in cases where a mess­
age is organized and omitted in one code to a group which receives it and 
decodes it using a different code, the meaning of the message will differ 
completely. This is what Eco calls 'aberrant decoding '. These assertions 
refer to the denotative meanings which are the ones that defined by the 
code in general, while the connotative meanings are given by subcodes or 
lexicons, common to certain groups and not to others.
Qarthes in Elements of Semiology, referring to Hjelralev, Observes that 
signification consists of a plane of expression also called signifier and 
a plane of content or signified, and that the signification is the relation 
of the two planes: ERC« This first system of signification is the plane of 
denotation. For example when in the system the work/pig/signifier has the 
content of the notion, "a useful animal that produces meat, bacon, etc." 
(signified), the relation between the signifior/pig/and the signified 
"very useful animal that produces moat", gives us the signification 
"animal, pig". In Saussure, it is not the raorphome/pig/, nor the actual 
animal in the farmyard, but the relating of the two together - signifier/ 
signified - which gives us this sign.
s .
animal pig
At a second level, the above relation between signifier and signified, 
i.e. the whole system of denoted meaning, becomes the plane of expression 
or the signifier of a second system. For instance, in the context of 
North American black movement the word pig does not mean the relation
7between the material object (animal) and what it signifies, but becomes 
the signifier of a new sign: policeman. This level is that of connotation*
pig i------ 1---- 1---- L
animal pig
concept: j 
pigness I
'pig'
As we »aid above the connotative meanings are defined by lexicons or 
subcodes used in certain contexts within certain groups. We have seen that 
though a message might be emitted and received in a common code, the 
connotations in this message would be decoded according to the lexicons 
of the receivers. This means that a connotation can be decoded originating 
different significations. For example, the same denotative system pig is 
the signifier of a second system where again the signified is the concept 
of pigness which originated the signification of our previous example: 
pig-policeman; now, read in the context of women's movement, this same animal 
+ quality of pigness connotes male-chauvinist quality in men.
pig
. animal pig
concept: 
pigness
(male chauvinist) 'pig' J
Another level of signification is called metalanguage. We may say that this 
level is parallel to that of connotation because, again, we have the whole 
first system (denotation) performing the role of just one element of the 
total meaning. But this time the whole denotative meaning fills in the 
box of the signified - rather than the signifier - of the second system.
V I r v
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This second system, derived as above, is called metalanguage. Metalanguage 
is a discourse about other systems which provide its content: it is 
communication about communication. Somiology is a metalanguage, since it 
'talks' about what it signifies.
Another type of second-order system is what Barthes calls myth. We suggest 
that myth should be thought of as a special type of connotation. This is 
because, according to Barthes, the mythical system is generated in the same 
way as connotation. The real soldier saluting the flag (signified) + the 
photograph of him saluting (signifier) gives us the denotation = negro 
saluting flag (sign). At the second level, this sign (negro saluting flag) 
+ the concept of French imperiality gives us the second order connotation 
which is 'France is a great empire, and all her sons without colour 
discrimination faithfully servo under her flag.' Barthes does not make it
8clear why this second order meaning, which he calls myth, is different 
from, rather than a special case, of connotation* Vo would like to suggest 
that the difference between myth and connotation depends on the amplitude 
of the lexicons from which the concepts are drawn- Ihe connoted meaning in 
'pig-policeman' and in 1pig-malechauvinist' are clearly linked to the lexicons 
of identifiable sub-groups- By contrast, myth scans identifiable with the 
lexicons of very ample groups, if not of the society as a whole. Myth 
therefore differs from connotation at the moment at which it attempts to 
universalize to the whole society meanings which are special to particular 
groups- In the process of universalizing its meaning, these meanings, which 
in the last instance are particular to a certain group, assume the amplitude 
of reality itself and are therefore naturalized- Thus, we might say, myths 
are connotations which have become doonnant-hegemonic.
In our paper for the journal (WFCS3) we emphasized quite emphatically that 
the ideological level always refers to the connotative meanings of the message- 
This was one of the strong criticisms raised by T« Lovell in her review of 
WFCS3 for Screen, so I would like to discuss this point again.
Tp start with, I think one misunderstanding could be due to our failure 
in explaining with more detail the concept of denotation- In my paper and 
in Stuart’s as well, though he dedicates a whole level of signification to 
what he calls 'formal-denotative', the concept of denotation was not made 
thoroughly clear- Barthes, in the 'Elements of Semiology* dismissed denota­
tion simply in terms of a fast system of signification which generates a 
second system (’’wider than the first”) which is the plane of connotation.
I think that, in part, the problem is to define what exactly is understood 
by level of signification. Veron observes: ” ... ideology _is a level of 
signification which operates by connotation and not by denotation.” (my emphasis) 
The fact that we, following Veron, asserted that ideology o. crates by 
connotation inside the message, was probably one of the reasons why Lovell 
assumed that we thought there was a pre-ideological, neutral, state of the 
message, which she identified with denotation. To this argument, Stuart 
replied that to retain the donotation/connotation distinction is not the 
same thing as thinking the denotative levels was ’ore-ideological'• The 
denotative process cannot be identified with a 'neutral state'; there can 
be no 'neutral' state because denotation, also, must be produced by the 
operation of a code. Thus we cannot be accused of searching for, or 
subscribing to, Barthes' idea of an 'enpty text'. Ihe distinction denotation/ 
connotation is, however, not only useful but indispensable, since the 
second can only exist through the first. This doesn't mean that there is no 
ideology at al}. in the process of denotation. I do not subscribe to the 
idea of a 'zero degree writing' nor to a text absolutely free of any 
ideological meaning; but I can see that there is a moment, like our first 
encounter with the message, where we have the impression of the absence 
of ideological meanings oven though to decipher this message we are using 
a cod, which is already ideological. If we can imagine such a moment where 
there are only denotative meanings, that in fact would be the moment where 
connotation is present at its minimum, tending to zero. This minimum, 
however, is present through the fact that ideology is a code, i.e. not a 
code in the sense of the inananent universe of the message, but a codified 
system of social reality. In this sense ideology is beyond and involves 
the whole universe of the sign as such - denotative or connotative. It is 
inside the coded sign that a distinction can be maintained, between denotation 
and connotation. And at this level of the analysis of the message, "the 
connotative/denotative distinction (...) remains pivotal”. In Stuart's 
reply to Lovell, this point is made more clearly: "I believe the method 
requires a distinction between the level of organization of the sign, at
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which, by means of a certain signifying codes, the sign can be produced at 
all (and a minimum level of perceptual recognition guaranteed - (...) ): 
and the ideological level of organization, where the sign is given a privil­
eged reading within the larger ideological syntagms of meaning." (Reply to 
Lovell, stencilled C.C.S.).
Barthes, himself, in S/Z (p.l6) elaborates his concept of denotation from 
the definitions he offered in Elements of Semiology: "Denotation is not the 
first sense, but it pretends to bo. Under this illusion in the end it is 
nothing but the last of connotation (where the reading is at the same time 
grounded and enclosed) the superior myth thanks to which the text pretends 
to return to the nature of language (...) we must keep denotation, old vigil­
ant deity, crafty, theatrical, appointed to represent the collective innocence 
of language." The semiologists contest the hierarchy of the denotation 
and connotation, saying that any language, with its dictionary and syntax 
is a system just like all others and therefore there is no reason for 
reserving denotation as a privileged first level neutral in itself, which 
originates all the others. Barthes however justifies his adoption of the 
distinction in an argument based primarily on Hjelmslev, a fact which demon­
strates his loyalty to linguistics, at least as far as the Elements period 
was concerned: " ... nous sommes encore soumis au prestige de la linguistique.."
The destruction of the connotation/denctation distinction is made through 
the identification of denotation with connotation and the fact that 
ideological meanings are present in both processes- Baudrillard, in 
Critique of the Political Economy cf the Sign, also does this; though he 
distinguishes the different degree »f ideological interference in each 
instance, he refuses the general distinction as it is usually used.
"Denotation is totally supported by the myth of 'objectivity1 (either 
concerning the linguistic sign, the analogous photographique, iconic sign, 
etc.) the direct adequacy of a signifier and a precise reality" (ray bad 
translation, see p.190). And further on: " ... denotation is distinct 
from other significations (connoted) by its singular function of effacing 
the traces of the ideological process in restoring it to the universal and 
the 'objective' innocence. Far from being the objective term to which 
connotation is opposed as the ideological term, denotation is thus, 
because it naturalizes this ideological process, the more ideological term"
... (my translation).
Though using arguments which appear to defend Semiology, I think Lovell's 
criticisms about our lack of scientific rigour, 'pace Barthes', is very 
close to the linguist's type of attack on Barthesian researchers, though 
mounted from a much more traditional sociological position. What I mean is 
that she doesn't argue based on the traditional linguistic distinction 
between semiology of communication and semiology of signification 
(distinction which I have never been fully able to understand) and she 
definitely does not accept the distinction denotation/connotation.
But on the other hand she suggests that semiology should limit itself 
to the study of the structural organization of language, "how it is coded" 
(semiology of communication???) and leave sociology to sort cut "the very 
meaning of ideological artefacts" (semiology of signification???) In one 
way or the other, Lovell's attack, which is made in terras of our 
'non-scientificity', is really mounted in the name of the hon-ideological 
science' of sociology - a position which I am very sceptical about.
Linguistics has always refused to be ideologically compromised and claims 
to be the only possibility to scientifically study language processes.
As a "social science, linguistics should study, prior to anything else,
to
the status of language itself in society; its role in the class struggle, 
its ideological determinations, etc- However, it contents itself to 
study/language as a7closed system, as one studies a mechanism, once again 
because the phonological model weighs heavily on it- The current impasse of 
linguistics with respect to semantics is proof that this model /of language 
as a closed system/ is inadequate. But at the same time linguistics appeals 
to be an enterprise which ideologically bleaches the language: treated simply 
as a communication instrument, linguistics will regard I anguage as a neutral 
’instrument', excluded from the field of social and political relations, the 
field of class conflic . " (my translation, R. Barthes, Louis-Jean Calvet)
Once agreed that the ideological instance refers to the connotative meanings 
of the message, our problem is how to detect it. In Barthes this preoccupa­
tion with the connotative-ideobgicr.l instance is constant, and this is one 
of the reasons we find him extremely useful (in spite of his 'fortuitous 
genius'). According to Calvet: " ... this hunt for false evidence is 
what constitutes the continuity cf Barthes' thought, this wish to unveil 
(...) the historical commitment (i.c. political) of all discourse ..."
Barthes' project of unmasking false appearances (which he says is the 
function of the mythologist of today) implies a description of the situation 
tomorrow and therefore implies a political position. "The unveil ing 
which it carries out is therefore a political fact: founded on a responsible 
idea of language, mythology thereby postulates the freedom of the latter." 
("Myth Today" in Mythologies, p.156)
For Barthes, ideology and rhetoric arc closely associated. Both of these 
concepts lead us to readings at the level of connotation. It is through the 
analysis of the rhetoric that we reach the ideological level. "This 
common domain of the signifieds of connotation is that of ideology, which 
can only be unique for a given society and history, whatever may be the sig- 
nifiers of connotation on which it draws. There are signifiers of 
connotation which correspond to general ideology and which are specified 
according to the substance chosen. We shall call these signifiers connoters, 
and the set of these connoters a rhetoric: the rhetoric thus appears as the 
signifying aspect of ideology," (Rhetoric of the image).
In Eco the couplet, rhetoric/ideology, is also basic to the process of 
'poetic decc ding'. For him, ideology is hidden under the rhetorical 
apparatus of the author of the message. Usually a code corresponds to an 
ideology; and, in many cases, a rhetoric is formally incorporated in a 
certain type of ideological information. The example he gives is the 
phrase: 'workers should remain in their posts'. This could, technically, 
be 'read' from two different lexicons; but in practice it would be 
rather unusual to find it in a revolutionary newspaper and quite 
commonplace to find it in a conservative newspaper. The fact that a 
rhetorical phrase fits one lexicon better than another happens because 
"a certain way of using the language is identified with a certain way of 
'thinking' society. Ideology has generated a rhetorical premise which has 
assumed a styled and recognisable forrr.." (my translation, La Struttura Assente)
Veron emphasizes that the key to understand the ideological dimension 
of the message lies in the organization of the semantic rules of these 
messages and not in their explicit content. This non-raanifest character 
of the message does not result from the intentional hiding of a certain 
content. When these contents ara communicated directly, or when the 
organization of the message is manifest, Yercn prefers to talk about 
propaganda, and not ideology. The manifest function of the messages 
should not be confounded with their ideological function.
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This non-mani~cst , . hidden or veiled content and organization of the· message 
refers to what we have been calling the ideological l evel of signification~ 
• J • • 
In this paper, we have been working , broadly, within a semiblogical frame-
work. The paper is not intended as a defence of semiology as such, about 
which we have many criticisms. Apart ~rom more detailed criticisms, semi ol-
ogy is often presented simply as a 'technical' kind of linguistic analysis : 
and, very often, it treats language and communication too'linguistically' -
as closed, formal systems, requiring an immanent analysis. It tends to 
abolish the h istorical dimension. For thQ purposes of this seminar, the 
detailed defence or critique of semiological methods is not what is really 
at issue. There is, however , something basic and central, which semiology 
as a method does clearly bring intc view, and this question is worth 
arguing about. Ideology is often understood es~ential ly a~ the tree 
floating, and biased ideas 'mich float about in society, and \ihich 
skew things in favour of the ruling class. This suggests that it is 
this free-floating 'thing' which we really need to analyse: and that it 
is only occasionally, and incidentally, that these ~deas take root in 
language and commUAication. From the perspective of this paper, ideol ogy 1s 
only present itt so far ~s -it' cru1 be shown to c. ist in and through the \iay 
l anguage and communication is structured and produced. Ideology is not 
hiding inside language - ideology is the name we give to the structure~g 
which language and communication undergoes. It is a dicension of, or better, 
an instance of all social communicationo We can only grasp it, analyse and 
~k it, because we can pin-point its 'mechanisms' in the production of 
meaning through language - that is, fundamentally, at the level at which 
language requires the operation of social codes to be produced. Whatever 
are the shortcomings of semiology, or semiologies, as a method, this outlook 
is basic to it, and distinguishes it from most other types of ideological 
analysis. It is in this sense, above all, that the paper is 'semiological 
in its basic perspective . 
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